The US is extremely lucky to have never had to put any of this into practice considering they've dropped live armed nukes by accident on mainland US of A several times .. and at least one should have detonated (but failed, by the narrowest margin) to detonate.
These are accidents in Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, etc - see "Broken Arrows".
#1 Lesson: If a nuclear weapon does detonate, don't immediately assume enemy action.
In 2007, six nuclear cruise missiles were "accidentally" loaded onto a bomber and the plane flew with them from North Dakota to Louisiana. But wait, it gets better: the plane sat on the tarmac, completely unguarded, for at least one night. The level of incompetence involved here is staggering, with probably dozens of people fucking up, and systemic issues abound:
The USAF attempted a coverup, classifying the incident as "no press interest anticipated."
We're also extremely lucky no rogue Air Force generals or the guys in the bunkers just said "fuck it" and launched missiles. Until Permissive Action Link system was set up, there was no presidential authority required on a technical level.
When PAL was set up, the Air Force set all the weapons to "00000000." I wish I were making that up. They did it to subvert the PAL program because the generals resented having to ask for authority to launch nukes in event it was necessary.
We're also extremely lucky there haven't been any nuclear incidents involving the team that transports nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material. They're reportedly underfunded, underpaid, and overworked. They've had numerous incidents involving team members getting drunk, as well as losing their service weapons.
The US nuclear weapons program, at least in the mid 2000's, was a clown show.
On the plus side, if even the USA is making all these mistakes, that increases my probably estimate that the Russian missiles are now unusable: the fuel drunk or used as fertiliser, or the flight computers or the fissile material used instead of a legitimate supplier by someone wanting to pocket the cost of making them new.
On the downside, it also increases my probability estimate that terrorist groups have some weapons-grade fissile material.
> When PAL was set up, the Air Force set all the weapons to "00000000." I wish I were making that up. They did it to subvert the PAL program because the generals resented having to ask for authority to launch nukes in event it was necessary.
While I overall agree with your point, the (alleged) reasoning behind having PAL codes at 00000000 was mainly about being _unable_ to retaliate in certain decapitation attack scenarios. I don't know how realistic this was, or to what degree it was just an excuse to get away with the behavior you quote.
"Technical incidents" is a far broader category than "armed nukes dropped on mainland USofA".
I guess we can agree there were a multitude of fuckups that almost resulted in an unintended nuclear explosion, but far fewer events of the specific nature I mentioned.
An excellent book. I read his research lasted seven years.
Worth noting: there is an American Experience documentary based on this book (with a primary focus on the Damascus incident), but it’s nowhere near as good as the text.
You really can't win. You think you're safe, located in or downwind from an area that's sufficiently remote, sparsely populated and strategically irrelevant so as not to be assigned its own warhead, only for it to transpire that your government is experimenting on you.
These are accidents in Georgia, North Carolina, Texas, etc - see "Broken Arrows".
#1 Lesson: If a nuclear weapon does detonate, don't immediately assume enemy action.