Remember that this is about Ontario, not Canada. Ontario happens to be the largest sub-sovereign debtor in the world and has had spreads over underlying CAD govie benchmarks increase dramatically over the past few years.

Unless this plan is revenue neutral, which is likely not going to be the case, markets will continue to charge ever greater premiums for borrowing. Ontario desperately needs to get its fiscal house in order; it spends like it's a sovereign with the capacity to access a broad set of monetary and fiscal measures that only sovereigns have.

Well the line between traders and quants has always been blurry to the point of no differential at Jane Street, D.E Shaw, and Citadel since inception. Traders have always had quant background, but have focused on more execution-oriented analysis whereas quants are a bit more idea-oriented.

Any sell-side investment bank still has clear lines between traders and quants. In fact, while they blurred more pre-2007 I'd argue they've become more clearly defined.

Source: work at a prominent investment bank.

>That was really really dumb. They should have gone from 0.25 to 0.3 or something.

That's not how interest rate setting works at all. Plus, the Fed is still using a banded window that encapsulates your five basis point rise.

What company is borrowing at Fed Funds rates? If - theoretically, because we have to be quite theoretical to operate under your assumptions - a company was that exposed to interest rates and had zero hedge against interest rate vol they would not have the credit to hope to get funding anywhere near Fed Funds rates.

If you're surviving at the edge of loans (i.e - you're in a potential distressed scenario) you'll have bonds trading at a significant discount. This is exactly what began to happen during the early part of 2015, when Fed Fund futures had little chance of the Fed moving priced in.

A quote that stuck with me from a molecular biology class taken a year ago, "It's not who wins a Nobel Prize off of CRISPR work, it's how many there will end up being".

Many in SV find it hard to grapple with traditional startups not penetrating health care to a greater degree; in Rise of the Robots (one of the Financial Times and The Economist books of the year) it's lamented for an entire chapter.

Traditionally the level of fundamental research and development displayed by Theranos - in areas of health or national defence - are done for years behind closed doors and then slowly rolled out to the public to mitigate any questioning of the underlying tech since the standards are understandably higher (i.e - it has to work from the start). This stands in contrast to the "move fast, break things" attitude pervasive in start-up culture.

I don't think there's anything necessarily fraudulent about Theranos, from what I've read, which seems to be the not-so-subtle undercurrent in much of the commentary. Rather they flipped the model startups should use in health, which is establish a business model that works and then work on preparatory tech in the background until it's ready to be rolled out. This seems to be largely what Theranos has done, but not what it's purposely chosen to articulate to the public and investors as it surely would have garnered less attention/funding. At this point Theranos seems to be playing the waiting game; waiting for their technology to reach a point where they can make a more transparent case for their business model and change the narrative once they've reached a point that's more aligned with the aspirations that have been articulated by Holmes for the past decade.

Once again, Peter Thiel's approach with Palantir looks to be extremely well executed and one that perhaps Theranos should have emulated.

Stating that your company has tech it does not have in order to lure investors and obtain contracts would be fraud. Whether that's in fact the case with Theranos will become clear eventually.

Yes, operating under the assumption early stage rounds were predicated on the technology existing and being sufficiently robust to carry out a certain percent of tests, that would be fraud.

Thing is, the approach your describing is fundamental dishonest... Leading investors to believe that you have technology that will be ready in 2011 when in reality you expect it to be ready in 2016 is not flipping a start up business model... It's just lying to get investor money

The latter half of that paragraph is articulating what I think Theranos is currently doing, not what I think they should have done.

What I said they should have done is described to their investors the business model that would act as a stop gap measure (gain market share and revenues by using existing technology) while allowing them to develop their proprietary technology to a point where it can get regulatory approval and can replace the already existing tech they're currently using.

> Leading investors to believe that you have technology that will be ready in 2011 when in reality you expect it to be ready in 2016 is not flipping a start up business model... It's just lying to get investor money

I've not seen any indication that rounds were predicated on certain delivery dates of the tech (what tech? what is the "success" percent? can the tech be augmented with more traditional tools?). If terms did get that specific, then there would be grounds for potential fraud.

The strategies being played by Theranos's executive don't look like Silicon Valley, IMHO. They look like outsiders cargo-culting the startup process: outside-looking-in Silicon Valley.

It's seems like there has been enough deception of investors, employees, partners and customers over the 12 years with little/nothing to show that "fraudulent" is probably the correct word.

Without knowing the term sheets and early investor negotiations that were held, I shy away from using the term fraudulent in the strict legal sense of the word.

Certainly you can argue more broadly that Theranos statements to the public over the past decade go beyond being disingenuous about their implementation of difficult technology and enter into fraudulent territory.

Would you please qualify Peter Thiel's approach here? and why it would have been a better model? Palantir is pure software company. Theranos is a suite of biomedical tests. This has a major lab/hardware component.

Theranos exists in a regulated industry where at a minimum as a lab developed test you have to abide by CLIA regulations. In addition you have to have validation, verification, design history and a whole bunch of documentation to prove that what you developed does what it should do and actually works.

The thing about Theranos is that the rules are well established.. You just have to follow them. If you don't know the rules you have to be a quick study or you have to hire experienced folks who know the rules and how to guide you through the process.

I'm not equating them absolutely, however I'm pointing out the Planatir began utilizing existing tech to make in roads into national defence while using that cash flow to create more proprietary technology that, once released, allowed the company to grow much quicker and that tech became it's mainstay. Presumably initial funding rounds and contracts were predicated on this being the strategy, not novel tech being utilized immediately (which is inline with what Theranos has done). The comparison stops there, at a macro level not micro level as you're describing, thus why only a sentence was devoted to it.

I largely agree with this, but would add that traders (and even investment bankers in their 30s/40s) will work very little on the weekend. Certainly no senior trader is in the office.

Princeton doesn't do transfers, Harvard/Yale have 1-2% transfer acceptance rates, etc.

When transfers are admitted every year to my school (usually just 5-10) there's a writeup in the school paper about them. Without fail they all a) were accepted here, but chose to go to a similar/competing school like Princeton and b) are exceptionally accomplished at a young age.

This shouldn't be taken as the typical situation at all, but I know of a guy who transferred from a CSU to Stanford (and went on to get his JD from a top law school). So it does happen.

In general, it might not quite be the case that it's (particularly) hard to transfer from a state school to an elite one. It's just the universe of people going to more democratic schools are distinct from those going to elite schools; in other words, if you took a random sampling of students who have no issues getting into top schools straight from high school and put them in community colleges for two years, they would have no issue transferring to a top school afterwards.

Stanford has a transfer acceptance rate of 2%, so good for him. As for your second point, that's likely true, but it'll still be much more difficult for them to transfer than to get in straight out of High School (and impossible at schools like Princeton).

Every transfer at Harvard I know of was admitted to Harvard, but just decided to go elsewhere before deciding Harvard was the right choice.

I'm about half-way through the book. Very easy, enjoyable read. Left wondering why some of these Amazon reviews try to make it sound as if it's quite academically/technically rigorous.

> Stairway to Paradise: Between drags on her cigarette, one student says that she will be working for Goldman Sachs.

As someone who worked at Goldman and is college-aged, I think this says quite a lot about the piece in general. Working at Goldman is not some kind of prestigious, difficult to obtain position. If you're in investment banking, that's laughable. If you're in the SSG, then that's only more mildly impressive. I did two-weeks in London where a few of the interns were part of the Pitt club at Cambridge (albeit, not quite as storied a group, but Cambridge's version of the Bullingdon Club) and seemed to revel in this prestige despite having decidedly worse placements in every way than myself. Only one of the three members were hired back full-time.

If these kids went to work at interesting hedge funds in Mayfair then I'm inclined to suggest they have some powerful connections. But, by in large, these are 18-21 year olds with all the insecurities and lack of knowledge you'd expect. In the world of finance perhaps this club helps getting you an interview at an investment bank, that's about it. Once you see how these things work you become cognizant of the fact that stories like this are more based in what the members of the clubs want you to believe secretively, or rather a writer would like to suggest is some vast conspiracy to pontificate on his or her moral outrage, then having even the slightest basis in reality.

Now, I would grant that having this kind of network gives opportunities to become more involved in politics (similar to what Cameron himself did) at an early age. That's fair, I suppose, however this notion of these secretive groups, with members who have intellects and connections that the average chap can only dream of ever obtaining is laughable. I'd encourage folks not to be drawn into articles like this, similar to the film The Riot Club, that seek to create heroic tragedies and spark mock outrage. Things are always more dull then they appear and most things aren't intricate conspiracy theories, which unfortunately HN seems to have a predisposition towards chatting about.

SSG is only "mildly impressive"? By what metric? Those positions put you squarely in line for mega fund private equity jobs. If thats par for your course, you must be in some pretty rarified air I guess.

The merits of those candidates is debatable, but the prestige of those positions really isn't.

Sure, I just wanted to clarify that "mildly impressive" in this context referred to "the relative prestige of that job within the spectrum of potential positions available to high performers and the sons and daughters of the ruling class at a small handful of the most elite universities worldwide." This is quite a bit different than what one would normally associate that phrase with.

That's fair. Would say that, in my experience, there wasn't much explicit nepotism at GS. If there was it'd be a case of someone's son getting good freshman/sophomore internships at small private equity shops, which made them a pretty sure merit-based bet getting into GS.

> Funny how the discussion is never to simplify the code

This has been the conversation in every political debate for (at least) the past decade. It could be the one broad sentiment shared across party lines.

Almost everyone agrees on simplifying the tax code, especially corporate tax, it just becomes more difficult when vested interests are adversely affected when the rubber meets the road.

Also, "simplify the tax code" is too often used as code language for wiping out progressive taxation (on the right) or wiping out corporate subsidies (on the left). Which makes the politics of the issue that much more intractable.